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AN ESSAY ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE UNITED
STATES VERSUS THE REST OF THE WORLD
Robert A. Sedler*
2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 377
During the past few years, in addition to the numerous presentations
on the constitutional protection of freedom of speech that I have made in
American venues, I have made some presentations to foreign audiences,
including a presentation at a colloquium at the University of Utrecht in the
Netherlands and lectures to the Faculty of Law at Mari State University in
Yoshkar-Ola, Russia. In the presentations before foreign audiences, I have
compared the very strong constitutional protection of freedom of speech in
the United States with the somewhat lesser protection of freedom of speech
provided under the constitutions of other democratic nations and under in-
ternational human rights norms. My foreign audiences have reacted with
astonishment at hearing how far the United States goes in protecting highly
offensive forms of speech that the rest of the democratic world prohibits,
such as "hate speech." In these presentations I have tried to explain why it
is that the American Constitution does provide so much protection to free-
dom of speech, including the kind of speech that most of the rest of the de-
mocratic world prohibits. My foreign audiences remained skeptical, and
their skepticism is shared by those American constitutional law commenta-
tors who have long contended that the Supreme Court has gone "too far" in
protecting freedom of speech against the government's efforts to prevent
and sanction "harmful" speech.'
In one of my recent presentations,2 I asked the participants to explore
the difference between constitutional protection of freedom of speech in the
United States and "the rest of the world" in light of humanistic values. I
* Distinguished Professor of Law, Wayne State University. A.B., 1956, J.D.,
1959, University of Pittsburgh. The title for this writing is taken from a presentation that I
made at the Wayne State University Humanities Brown Bag Colloquium Series on October
18, 2005.
1. For criticism of the Court's decisions on "hate speech" and pornography, see, for
example, MARl MATSUDA, CHARLES LAWRENCE, RICHARD DELGADO & KIMBERLE
CRENSHAW, WORDS THAT WOUND (1993); THE PRICE WE PAY: THE CASE AGAINST RACIST
SPEECH, HATE PROPAGANDA AND PORNOGRAPHY (Laura Lederer & Richard Delgado eds.,
1995); Catherine MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 1 (1985).
2. Robert A. Sedler, Wayne State University Humanities Center Brown Bag Collo-
quium Series, Freedom of Speech: United States vs. the Rest of the World (Oct. 18, 2005).
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asked them to consider questions such as whether humanistic values provide
guidance as to how strongly we should protect freedom of speech when it
takes the form of "hate speech" and what most of us would consider "bad
ideas." Conversely, I asked them to consider whether humanistic values
could be relied on to justify the strong constitutional protection that we give
to freedom of speech in the United States.
Somewhat to my surprise, a consensus seemed to emerge. The con-
sensus was that the strong constitutional protection for freedom of speech in
the United States was itself an American humanistic value, a value that was
the product of our own history and experience, and a value that is reflected
in American culture. Thus, in the United States, a concern for humanistic
values would justify protecting "bad ideas" and "harmful speech" rather
than restricting them. This conclusion was in accord with my long-held
position that the strong constitutional protection of freedom of speech in the
United States is an integral part of American culture, resulting from our own
history and experience. It is an American phenomenon. By the same token,
I have also maintained that other nations, with a different history and ex-
perience, could understandably be less protective of freedom of speech than
we are, and that freedom of speech would play a less important role in the
culture of that nation than it plays in American culture.
The classic example of such a nation in my opinion is Germany, a na-
tion trying to combat the horrific legacy of Nazism and the Holocaust, so
that surely Germany could not be expected to tolerate any form of "hate
speech" or any display of Nazi symbols or any advocacy of genocide. The
same might be true of the European nations that endured terrible suffering
under the Nazi aggression of World War II and the Holocaust, and of the
State of Israel. In any event, I maintain that the strong constitutional protec-
tion of freedom of speech in the United States is embedded in the American
culture of the twenty-first century and that the Supreme Court's expansive
interpretation of the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech
serves to implement the values of American society today.
I begin my presentations on the strong protection of freedom of speech
under the American Constitution by pointing out that many of the guaran-
tees of the Bill of Rights, such as the First Amendment, have been drafted in
broad and sweeping terms, so that their meaning depends on the interpreta-
tion of those provisions by the Supreme Court over a long period of time.3 I
also point out that since the United States Constitution was promulgated in
1787, when international law was in its infancy, it should not be surprising
3. I have referred to these provisions as "broadly phrased and open ended," and
best described as "majestic generalities." Robert A. Sedler, The Legitimacy Debate in Con-
stitutional Adjudication: An Assessment and a Different Perspective, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 93,
122 (1983). They thus require massive definition to operate effectively as limitations on
governmental power, as the Framers intended. See id.
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that, unlike the situation in some nations with modem constitutions, interna-
tional law is not a part of American constitutional law.' This means that
international human rights norms relating to limitations on freedom of
speech are not by their own force a part of American constitutional law.
The Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment's guarantee
of freedom of speech very expansively, and the constitutional protection
afforded to freedom of speech is perhaps the strongest protection afforded to
any individual right under the Constitution. In the United States, as a con-
stitutional matter, the value of freedom of speech generally prevails over
other democratic values, such as equality, human dignity, and privacy. In
the United States, other democratic values must be advanced by means that
do not abridge freedom of speech. It is for this reason that the constitutional
protection afforded to freedom of speech in the United States is seemingly
unparalleled anywhere else in the world, and why the American view of
freedom of speech is not always consistent with international human rights
norms and the protection of freedom of speech in other democratic coun-
tries. International human rights norms and the constitutional law of other
democratic countries treat freedom of speech as an important right, but one
that must be balanced against other democratic rights. This being so, inter-
national human rights norms and the constitutional law of other democratic
countries recognize certain restrictions on freedom of speech that would be
prohibited under the First Amendment.
The best example of such a restriction is that on "propaganda for war"
and "hate speech" imposed under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. While Article 19 of the Covenant generally protects free-
dom of speech, Article 20 requires that any propaganda for war and any
advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes incitement
to discrimination, hostility, or violence, be prohibited by law.' "War propa-
ganda" and "hate speech" are in most circumstances protected by the First
Amendment.6 This being so, when the United States Senate ratified the
Covenant, the resolution of ratification contained a reservation to the effect
that "Article 20 does not authorize or require legislation or other action by
the I Inited States that would restrict the ri ght nf free sn,eoh and sncanttnaf
protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States."7
4. Indeed, under the Supremacy Clause, Article VI, Section 2, a treaty stands only
on the same footing as a federal law, so that if a treaty is in irreconcilable conflict with a later
enacted federal law, the federal law controls, even though this effective repeal of a treaty
may put the United States in violation of its obligations under international law. See Chae
Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
5. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 19-20, Mar. 23, 1976,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter International Covenant].
6. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); Dawson v. Delaware,
503 U.S. 159 (1992).
7. S. Exec. Res. 95-2, 102d Cong., Cong. Rec. 4783 (1992) (enacted).
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In my presentations I then give my explanation of how it has happened
that the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment's
guarantee of freedom of speech so broadly, with the result that the constitu-
tional protection afforded to freedom of speech in the United States is seem-
ingly unparalleled anywhere else in the world. In my view, this is the result
of the fact that, in our constitutional system, constitutional law develops on
a case-by-case basis through the process of constitutional litigation.8 As the
Supreme Court has decided First Amendment cases over the years, it has
promulgated concepts, principles, and doctrines and has established prece-
dents. These concepts, principles, doctrines, and precedents comprise what
I call the "law of the First Amendment," and as constitutional protection has
been extended to freedom of speech in one situation, that protection has
been carried over to other situations implicating First Amendment rights.
The sum total of the components of the law of the First Amendment pro-
vides a great deal of protection to freedom of speech, and, for this reason, in
First Amendment litigation there is an increased likelihood that the First
Amendment claim will prevail.9
The operation of the law of the First Amendment may be best under-
stood from the perspective of the litigating lawyer and judge presented with
a First Amendment issue. To the litigating lawyer and judge, it is as if the
different components of the law of the First Amendment are flashed as a
menu on a computer screen, and the task of the lawyer or judge, so to speak,
is to press the right key. This calls up the substance of the applicable com-
ponent of the law of the First Amendment and the relevant precedents. The
task of the lawyer and judge then is to apply the applicable component and
precedents to the resolution of the First Amendment issue presented in the
particular case. The parameters for the resolution of that issue are now es-
tablished, and in many cases, that resolution will be fairly clear.
The way that constitutional protection of freedom of speech has de-
veloped in the United States may be contrasted with the way that individual
rights are protected under international human rights documents such as the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, mentioned above.
Here the process is a legislative one, and the drafters were in a position to
balance and accommodate different individual rights, and to make value
judgments as to appropriate limitations on particular individual rights.
Thus, the drafters of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
8. As discussed previously, the First Amendment has been drafted in broad and
sweeping terms, and for this reason, the text of the First Amendment does not contain any
standard for determining permissible restrictions on freedom of speech. The restrictions that
are permissible are those that have been developed by the Supreme Court in its interpretation
of the First Amendment.
9. See generally Robert A. Sedler, The First Amendment in Litigation: The "Law of
the First Amendment," 48 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 457 (1991).
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Rights made the value judgment in Article 19 that freedom of speech is an
important individual right that should be protected."0 But in Article 20, they
qualified the protection given to freedom of speech by denying protection to
what they considered to be particularly harmful ideas, such as the "advo-
cacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to dis-
crimination, hostility or violence.""
When the United States Supreme Court was faced with constitutional
challenges to laws that prohibited "hate speech" or "incitement to discrimi-
nation, hostility or violence,"' 2 the Court resolved those challenges by ap-
plying two principles that had emerged from its cases over the years: the
principle of content neutrality and the principle of the protection of offen-
sive speech. The application of these principles leaves no room for the kind
of value judgments embodied in Article 20 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights. Rather, the application of these principles re-
quires the protection of all ideas, no matter how harmful the Court may con-
sider them to be and no matter how disagreeable or offensive they may be to
the larger society.
I will now discuss these principles and relate them to the constitutional
protection of "hate speech" under the First Amendment-a result that many
Americans and most of the rest of the democratic world strongly deplores.
As to the protection of offensive speech, the Supreme Court has stated
that "[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is
that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply be-
cause society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."' 3 The Court
made this statement when it was invalidating a law prohibiting the desecra-
tion of the American flag, noting that "[w]e have not recognized an excep-
tion to this principle even where our flag has been involved."' 4 Nor may the
government prohibit the expression of an idea in a particular manner that is
highly offensive to many people, such as a person's expressing opposition
to the military draft during the Vietnam War by wearing a jacket embla-
zoned with the "unseemly expletive,' 5 "Fuck the Draft."'6 This principle
even extends to the protection of offensive advertising. Under this princi-
ple then, whenever the government trieS to iiitifv a han on exnression on
10. See International Covenant, supra note 5, art. 19.
11. Id. at art. 20.
12. Id.
13. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
14. Id.
15. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 23 (1971).
16. Id. at 16.
17. See Bolger v. Young Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (holding violative
of the First Amendment a federal law prohibiting the advertising of contraceptive products
on the ground that such advertising would be offensive to many persons).
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the ground that the idea itself, or the manner in which it is expressed, is
highly offensive to many people, that justification is necessarily improper.
The most important First Amendment principle in practice is that of
content neutrality. Under this principle, the government may not proscribe
any expression because of its content, particularly because of the viewpoint
it expresses. The underlying premise of this principle is that the First
Amendment establishes a marketplace of ideas, that all ideas, good and bad,
must be able to compete in this marketplace, and that the remedy for bad
speech is more speech, not enforced silence. 8 The principle of content neu-
trality invalidates a law prohibiting the display of any sign in front of a for-
eign embassy that "tends to bring that foreign government into 'public
odium' or 'public disrepute,"' since it only prohibits displays that are criti-
cal of the foreign government and not displays that are favorable to it.' 9 It
also invalidates a federal law allowing the wearing of American military
uniforms in performances and portrayals only if the performance or por-
trayal did not "tend to discredit the military."2° The content neutrality prin-
ciple was the basis for the Supreme Court's striking down state and federal
laws that prohibited the burning of the American flag. Since the laws au-
thorized burning as a proper means of disposing of a torn or soiled flag, the
18. It is this underlying premise that is subject to relentless attack by critics of the
Court's current First Amendment jurisprudence. They reject the notion of a marketplace of
ideas, since they say there cannot be equal competition in that marketplace. The media and
the wealth interests, they correctly point out, have a much bigger "stall in the marketplace"
than dissident groups. This is true, of course, but the history of the First Amendment in the
United States has been one of dissident groups seeking access to the marketplace, so that
they can express their ideas with whatever resources they may have. But above all, say the
critics, there are bad ideas, like genocide, racism, sexism, and homophobia, that find their
way into the marketplace, and the government should be able to prohibit the expression of
bad ideas because of the harm that they can cause to society and to "victim groups." My
rejoinder here is that, at different times in our nation's history, the government has tried to
repress what many people at the time considered to be a bad idea. During the Cold War era,
the government tried to repress the idea of communism, which carried over to any opposition
to the capitalistic economic system and to American foreign policy. During the civil rights
movement, governments in the Southern states tried to repress the idea of integration as
being "harmful to the Southern way of life." During the Vietnam era, the government tried
to repress opposition to the war as being "unpatriotic" and "helping the enemy." Today, it is
argued that the government should suppress what many of us consider to be bad ideas, like
genocide, racism, sexism, and homophobia. The list of potential bad ideas is endless, and if
the government could suppress what this group or that group considers to be a bad idea at
this time or at that time, a great many ideas would have disappeared from the public dis-
course, and the government would be a perpetual censor of "bad ideas." Under the principle
of content neutrality, however, the government cannot suppress any ideas. All ideas, good
and bad, must be free to compete in the marketplace of ideas, and it is up to the people, not
the government, to decide what is a "bad idea."
19. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 315 (1988).
20. Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 62 (1970).
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impact of the prohibition was directed toward the "content of the message"
conveyed by the burning, and, as such, was unconstitutional.2
The principles of protection of offensive speech and content neutrality
explain why it is that in the United States "hate speech" receives constitu-
tional protection. The government cannot prohibit "hate speech" on the
ground that it may be offensive to many people and to "victim groups." The
offensive nature of the speech, far from justifying its prohibition, is pre-
cisely the reason why it is entitled to constitutional protection. And, as ex-
plained above, the government cannot prohibit "hate speech" on the ground
that it expresses a "bad idea" and is inconsistent with democratic values.
Under the principle of content neutrality, the idea of inequality is entitled to
compete in the marketplace of ideas with the idea of equality. Similarly, the
idea of genocide, the idea of holocaust denial, and any idea, no matter how
extreme or repugnant, is entitled to be expressed. Thus, the First Amend-
ment protects a march by self-styled "Nazis" with Nazi uniforms and swas-
tikas in a city with a large Jewish population, including many holocaust
survivors.22 Such a march, of course, would be prohibited under interna-
tional human rights norms.23
We see then that in the United States freedom of speech receives a
very high degree of constitutional protection. The constitutional protection
afforded to freedom of speech is perhaps the strongest protection afforded to
any individual right under the American Constitution, and the value of free-
dom of speech generally prevails over other democratic values such as
equality, human dignity, and privacy.24
21. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 412 (1989); see also United States v. Eichman,
496 U.S. 310, 317-18 (1990).
22. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1198-99 (7th Cir. 1978).
23. A number of judicial decisions have upheld "hate speech" laws against freedom-
of-speech claims. See The Queen v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 698 (holding that a
Canadian law prohibiting "wilfully promot[ing] hatred against an identifiable group" does
not violate the freedom-of-speech guarantee of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms); Robert Faurisson v. France, U.N. Human Rights Comm'n, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/58/D/
550/1993 (1996) (French law making it an offense to contest the existence of the category of
crimes against humanity as defined in the London Charter of August 8, 1945, which includes
genocide, does not violate the freedom-of-speech guarantees of Article 10 of the European
Convention on Human Rights or Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights); Holocaust Denial Case, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitu-
tional Court], Apr. 13, 1994, 90 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BverfGE]
241 (F.R.G.) (application of law prohibiting a meeting of a group to promote Holocaust
denial did not violate the freedom-of-speech guarantee of the German Constitution). Cf
Ceylan v. Turkey, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. 73 (2000) (where the court found that a conviction of a
labor leader for writing a news article denouncing the "terrorist" anti-Kurd policies of the
Turkish government violated Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights).
24. I think that Justice John Marshall Harlan, Jr. has given what is perhaps the most
cogent explanation of the First Amendment value of freedom of speech and its role as an
integral part of the American culture:
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The consequence of this very high degree of constitutional protection
to freedom of speech in the United States is that ideas most Americans con-
sider very repugnant, and that may be hurtful to some people, such as racial
hatred, can be expressed freely. At the same time, the expansive protection
to freedom of speech under the First Amendment ensures robust debate on
all public issues and the widest dissemination of all ideas. As stated above,
under the First Amendment, there is no such thing as a "bad idea," and the
remedy for bad speech is said to be "more speech, and not enforced si-
lence. '25 It is part of our culture that people are "free to speak their mind"
and need not fear that they will be sanctioned for saying something that is
offensive or unpopular. The government is not required to and, more im-
portantly, is not permitted to make decisions about what ideas may be ex-
pressed and what ideas may not be expressed. The constitutional guarantee
of freedom of expression under the First Amendment then means freedom
of expression in the fullest sense. For better or worse, this is the American
way.
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a society as di-
verse and populous as ours. It is designed and intended to remove governmental
restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what views
shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such
freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity
and in the belief that no other approach would comport with the premise of indi-
vidual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests.
To many, the immediate consequence of this freedom may often appear to be
only verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive utterance. These are, however,
within established limits, in truth necessary side effects of the broader enduring
values which the process of open debate permits us to achieve. That the air may at
times seem filled with verbal cacophony is, in this sense not a sign of weakness but
of strength. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, in what otherwise might seem a
trifling and annoying instance of individual distasteful abuse of a privilege, these
fundamental societal values are truly implicated.
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1971) (internal citation omitted).
25. I recently participated in the U.S. Department of State International Visitor
Program, making presentations on American constitutional law to small groups of mostly
Moslem visitors from European countries. At the same time, controversy was raging world-
wide over the publication of a cartoon of the Prophet Mohammed in a Danish newspaper.
Likewise, France had recently enacted a law directed against the wearing of the head scarf by
Moslem schoolgirls, and Turkey, an overwhelmingly Moslem but officially secular nation,
has long prohibited the wearing of the Moslem head scarf in any public buildings. I pointed
out to my audiences that in the United States, the First Amendment would protect the right of
a newspaper to publish a cartoon of the Prophet Mohammed, and would also protect the right
of Moslem schoolgirls and Moslem women to wear the head scarf as a form of religious
expression.
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